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Introduction 
t a conference on developing the capacity of systems biology to transform itself 
in systems biomedicine, several of the VFLHQWLVWV¶ presentations showcase the com- 
putational modelling methods they are developing. Drawing towards the end of his 
presentation, an experienced pharmacologist admonishes the audience to bear in mind 
that, despite the progress in modelling techniques that he has been discussing, a model 
is always just a representation and never reality. At this point, there is a PowerPoint 
slide showing 0DJULWWH¶V painting, This is not a Pipe, and chuckling from the audience. 
It will not have been the first time that they have seen it, as the painting is by now a 
trope running through these events, rivalled only by the quotation from George Box: 
µ(VVHQWLDOO\DOOPRGHOVDUHZURQJEXWVRPHDUHXVHIXO¶,QGHHG,KDYHWDNHQXS this 
trope myself, but find that I need to judge my audience carefully when choosing what 
to move on with. Fairly unproblematic is the choice to follow up with Jorge Luis 
%RUJHV¶V story about the unconscionable maps, µ2Q Exactitude in 6FLHQFH¶ but more 
problematic is to follow up with 3LFDVVR¶V portrait of Gertrude Stein, together with the 
quotation attributed to Picasso: µ(YHU\ERG\ says that she does not look like it but that 
does not make any difference, she ZLOO¶ 
The trope of 0DJULWWH¶V pipe/non-pipe foregrounds issues of representation for sci- 
entists, serving to make obvious the gap between models and reality. This analogy 
between art and science is based on a deficit model of concepts like µILFWLRQ¶ µPHWD- 
SKRU¶DQGµQDUUDWLYH¶ZKLFKIRFXVRQZKDWWKHVHPRGHVRIH[SUHVVLRQDUHQRW not 
true, not real, not literal. In this chapter, I propose that one of the roles for the critical 
medical humanities scholar in this domain is instead to shift the conversation towards 
different analogies that are based on a generative and productive model of art: the 
world-making and world-collaborating modes of art. 
The chapter starts by outlining the kind of modelling characteristic of systems 
biomedicine, an intricate hybrid of wetlab experiments, mathematical modelling and 
computational simulations. This hybridity brings with it a number of epistemic as well 
as social challenges, which are particularly evident in the visual displays that mediate 
observational and evidentiary styles and communications between the disciplines, and 
in the different attitudes around the matter of models and their targets. In the second 
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section, I focus on the realism of models as a central focus of VFLHQWLVWV¶ interest and 
disagreement, and discuss continuities between science and art forms with respect to 
realism and other ways of being µZRUOG-GLUHFWHG¶ Juxtaposing critiques of realism in 
the humanities and in science studies, I track a movement from anti-realism to non- 
dualist reconfigurations of the entire framework for thinking about the relationship 
between models and world. In the third section, I consider how these non-dualist 
frameworks open up different ways of thinking about systems biomedicine and the 
implications for ourselves as µGLJLWDO SDWLHQWV¶ I conclude with a brief note about the 
responsibilities that this implies for the critical medical humanities   scholar. 
 
Systems Biomedicine and its Models 
It is well known that models are pervasive in biomedical scientific practice; a wide 
range of organisms, animals and material artefacts are used to instantiate biological 
entities and processes or to stand proxy for broader or different classes. Models are 
a huge part of the mundane reality of biomedical scientists, who devote a large pro- 
portion of their research time and their energy to developing, constructing, using and 
refining specific types. Computational models are relative newcomers in this already 
jostling mix of models in biomedical research. Having arrived on the scene in the last 
few decades,1 these models elicit a wide range of responses, from suspicion to opti- 
mistic confidence that they will be a major force in shaping biomedical research and 
its carry-through, or µWUDQVODWLRQ¶ to medical applications. Computational modelling 
is very broad, and could potentially be used in almost any strand of research. Systems 
biology as a new field and approach to biomedicine is entirely predicated upon the 
possibilities of modelling complex biological processes that advanced computational 
technologies and resources allow. In this sense, it is typical of technoscience, where 
science and technologies cannot be peeled off each other, the whole embedded in a 
complex network of social and institutional relations. 
The specific technologies that have made systems biology possible are, on the one 
hand, the sheer computational power for constructing and managing large databases, 
and for running simulations that once took days, if not weeks, in a few hours; and 
on the other, the devices and means for gathering data, the developments of algo- 
rithms for processing data, and the development of techniques for constructing simula- 
tions and visualisations. There are many different forms of computational model and 
modelling approaches.2 One can make a rough distinction between (1) data-intensive 
modelling approaches that harness new technologies for generating, storing and inte- 
grating data, together with algorithms to discover patterns  and  interactions among 
data, which are taken as models of, for example, molecular interactions; and (2) com- 
putational science approaches that are based upon mathematical models and compu- 
tational simulations of dynamical biological processes. In fact, these approaches are 
often closely associated. From the perspective of their construction, computational 
models are hybrids.3 Ideally, in biomedical sciences, there is a very close connection 
between  experiments  (using  cells,  tissues,  organs,  non-human  animals  or humans), 
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mathematical modelling and computational simulation. This is especially important 
the closer the research comes to medical applications, such as for diagnosis, drug 
safety testing or treatment. The hybridity of the models is both methodological and 
ontological. It is methodologically hybrid for two reasons. Firstly, there are clearly a 
number of methodologies involved in constructing the computational models: experi- 
mental, mathematical, computational. Secondly, during the modelling process, there 
is not a clear dividing line between experiment, equation and simulation, in the 
sense that they are all geared towards each other. Experimental techniques are used, 
but the nature of the experiment changes as it becomes geared towards producing 
data for models and for testing the output of the simulation. Mathematical 
modelling is not validated purely in the mathematical terms of deduction and proof 
but needs to be geared both towards experiments and towards the numerical 
techniques of simulation; the outputs of simulations are interpreted against the 
background of the interconnec- tion between experiments, equations and the 
simulation techniques employed. There- fore, not only methodologically but 
ontologically too, what is called a µFRPSXWDWLRQDO PRGHO¶ is a hybrid system of 
interconnected experiments, equations and simulations. An illustration of this sort of 
hybrid system can be seen in Figure 2.1. Constructed computational models cannot 
simply be compared with a target domain in order to see whether they successfully 
represent that target, since there are not necessarily sufficient grounds of comparability 
between them. Especially when computational models are being brought into 
medical and clinical contexts, they meet up with a wide variety of different types of 
data and accompanying instruments, techniques and typical research questions. 
Appropriate comparability is not given in advance, but needs to be worked at and 
produced through ongoing iterations of modelling and testing. In this process, 
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the model as entity, even as a hybrid entity, falls into the background, and it is just as 
well to talk about modelling as activity and process. 
Each of the elements in the model system is a temporary moment in the process, 
materialised through apparatus (wetlab apparatus and instruments, the computers 
and computational infrastructure for the running of simulations), symbolic systems 
(language, mathematical and numerical symbols, graphs and diagrams) and differ- 
ent modes of observation, such as the output of tracking devices, microscopy and the 
visualisations generated by simulations.4 The entire process is mediated through visual 
outputs, which are both materialisations of the ongoing modelling process and social 
junctures for the process.5 The visual displays of outputs have the dual role of making 
accessible the observations afforded by the different techniques, and of communicat- 
ing these to others.6 Visual displays are occasions for researchers to gather together for 
data interpretations and discussions of the modelling process; they facilitate the inte- 
gration and interplay of the different aspects of the process; and they mediate social 
interactions of the different disciplines involved. Considering how closely related 
visual displays are to the observational and evidentiary styles of different epistemic 
cultures,7 their role goes far beyond being mere vehicles for communication. For exam- 
ple, the visualisations of computational simulations are often alien to microscopists, 
and the microscopical observations can be meaningless to computational scientists. 
Through the visual displays, there can be an alignment of methodologies: we see this 
when simulators and experimentalists start to adopt the same way of rendering their 
visual displays. Alternatively, the visual displays make the faultlines between disci- 
plines stand out even more.8 Thus the visual displays are active mediators throughout 
the negotiations and rapprochements or distances between communities. 
As already noted, computational modelling is still fairly new in these domains; it 
has yet to prove itself, and often even has yet to show itself worthy of the time, energy 
and resources that are required to test it. It needs an intricate set of interdisciplinary 
relations between experimentalists, mathematicians and computer scientists to get off 
the ground, which will (if successful) ultimately produce a different transdisciplinary 
space where both the entities researched and the researchers are not quite the same as 
at the outset. Forging the collaboration network is not easy. Adopting a methodology 
as different as computational modelling implies a very deep shift for researchers. For 
example, a biological process observed through microscopy is a very different entity 
to a biological process (even ostensibly the same one) computationally modelled. It 
positions the researcher in a very different way with respect to the research process, 
involving a different research identity. A question might even arise as to whether what 
is seen is still a biological process, and whether one is still involved as a witness to a 
currently occurring biological process, as one is in a wetlab experiment.9 What is seen, 
observed and explored and who sees, observes and explores are defined in terms of 
each other. There are ontological stakes for researchers too, and this is manifested in 
a recurring concern in encounters around computational modelling between different 
disciplines. This is a concern with what is real or realistic. For experimentalists, in the 
laboratory or in the clinic, computational models often evoke responses that put into 
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doubt the reality of what they seem to show, and there are often disagreements or ten- 
sions over what counts as realistic.10 Loosened from the material experimental setting 
of in vivo or in vitro models and all the apparatus around them, computationally gen- 
erated visualisations are not perceived (literally) as showing something that is a µUHDO¶ 
process. Mathematicians instead hold a quantitative representation of a biological 
process to be more realistic than a qualitative one, because it represents mechanisms ± 
that is, mechanisms quantitatively rendered rather than observed. Models are most 
often described as representations or descriptions in the everyday language and in the 
publications of biomedical modelling, even though the meaning of µUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶ is 
rarely made explicit. Thus, in the discourse of scientific modelling, the terms µUHDOLVWLF¶ 
and µUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶ are frequently and unself-consciously used, and demands made on 
each other in the interdisciplinary negotiations and dialogues (and breakdowns) are 
frequently couched in these terms. To doubt whether something is a representation is 
at the same time, in this discourse, to doubt whether it is a model at all. Even though 
computational modelling is heralded by some to be a new paradigm of modelling 
(and hence science), there are also sceptical questions raised about whether they are 
still models in the same way as the accepted forms of models of biomedical research: 
organisms, non-human animals and humans, and material  models.  Whether  or not 
they are accepted as models betrays deeply held expectations about the processes 
and criteria whereby something becomes a model in the different scientific 
communities implicated in the demand, by computational modelling, to be recognised 
as    such. 
What is behind this scepticism has in part already been discussed; beyond the 
visual differences between the different displays, there is also the matter of matter. 
That is, the observations afforded by these different displays are in different mate- 
rial modalities and of very different material entities. Experimentalists understand 
themselves to be observing the process they are investigating in a particular model 
organism. This is an indirect and often highly stylised and constructed process, but 
yet they take themselves to be in µFDXVDO FRQWDFW¶ with the process, through their 
visual displays: looking through a microscope, or looking at images of different 
kinds, or graphs produced through some form of automated tracing. Ultimately, 
even if only through long and intricate chains, these visual displays bear the traces 
of familiar equipment and lead back to something organic, something actually bio- 
logical: that is, the wet stuff of a wetlab. Often the wonder of being a biologist is 
that these organic things can be coaxed into visibility at all.11 In a computational 
visualisation, however, what is seen is something that is not itself organic or 
µZHW¶ moreover, its relation to equipment connecting it indirectly to the organic 
cannot be µUHDG RII¶ it. In fact, what is seen is a mathematical±computational 
entity that yet appears as more vividly, concretely present than the organic thing 
that is often so tenuously visible.12 In systems biomedicine, there is a preference for 
models that are µRI the same PDWWHU¶ as the target domain ± such as cell, tissue or 
animal models: these often count as more realistic, and as epistemologically 
privileged.13 A response from systems biomedicine is to try to position their models 
in the same terminology ± in vivo, in vitro, in silico. Rhetorically, this addition of 
µLQ VLOLFR¶ in a parallelism 
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with µLQ YLYR¶ and µLQ YLWUR¶ suggests a seamless continuity between these modalities 
of experimental models, a parallelism of matter to match the parallelism of form. 
It counters the perception that computational models are abstract, and gives them 
a matter ± silicon ± that is rhetorically suggested as being analogous to the matter 
of  other  models  in  biology.  The  very  use  of  this  rhetorical  device  in characteris- 
ing experimental models already points to the crucial importance of sociability in            
constructing systems biomedicine: others must be persuaded, and, as we shall see, 
models must be constructed in accordance with the rhetoric, trying to make the 
parallelism as close to a reality as possible. 
 
Realism, Really? 
There are several parallels between the enterprise of modelling in science and in art 
(by art, I mean art in the broad sense: including visual, performance and literary arts), 
starting with the difficulty of getting new modes of modelling accepted, which is analo- 
gous to getting new styles accepted in art. In both art and science, there are nego- 
tiations, tensions, rifts over what is to count as art, as science, as representation (or 
whatever label is thought to be at stake) in the face of rupture or difference with exist- 
ing styles. In the case of models, the parallels with art go even deeper because what is 
at stake is precisely the same issue: the relationship whereby something ± an organism, 
an equation, a portrait and so on ± gains meaning or significance in virtue of appear- 
ing to µVWDQG in IRU¶ µSRLQW WRZDUGV¶ something else ± another organism, a biological 
process, a particular person. Science and art are both domains where this relationship 
cannot be taken for granted; they both experiment with new ways of establishing the 
relationship, struggle to establish it, question the way it is currently or traditionally 
made, and try new ways of making it repeatedly. 
This insight into the continuity between science and art is not a new one. In the 
philosophy of modelling, the analogy between art and science falls into two camps. 
µ0RGHOVDVILFWLRQV¶DFFRXQWVIRFXVHLWKHURQWKHDFFXUDF\RIPRGHOVRURQWKHLU ref- 
erence: for example, on questions concerning whether the idealisation of models 
results in inaccurate representations of the real world phenomenon modelled, just as 
LQILFWLRQHYHQWVDQGFKDUDFWHUVDUHQRWGHSLFWHGDVWKH\µUHDOO\¶DUHRURQ questions 
concerning whether the referents of models exist, and if so, whether their mode of 
existence is akin to that of fictional entities.14 µ0RGHOVDVPHWDSKRUV¶DFFRXQWV focus 
instead on the question µKRZ do models ZRUN¶ and their answer is: µLQ the same way 
as PHWDSKRUV¶ These accounts are not as immediately concerned with semantics and 
truth as they are with understanding something about how models in science are put 
together: the arrangement of elements that allows them to gain a particular purchase 
on the domain they are targeting.15 With these approaches, a different set of questions 
about truth and models emerges: this time, the questions emerge in the terms of the 
opposition between the metaphorical and the literal, and whether, RQWKHµPRGHOV as 
PHWDSKRUV¶DFFRXQWLWLVSRVVLEOHfinally, to literalise models, so that their truth (or 
not) can be evaluated. 
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On these views of models as fictions, parallels between science and art are encour- 
aged and enjoyed up to the limits of questioning the reality of scientific objects. If sci- 
entific models can be understood as fictions, it is only to the extent that, like fictions, 
their relation to reality is not straightforward. If they can be understood as operating 
like metaphors, it is only to the extent that, like metaphors, they are not literally true. 
The assumption, though, is generally that science is directed towards the real and the 
literal in ways that fictions and (for example) poetic metaphors are not and need not 
be. But this deep and long-standing assumption is precisely what we need to contest. 
The deficit account fails to take into consideration the different ways in which art 
and literature can be world-directed. The realist movement that reached its apogee in 
the late nineteenth century, and continued in various forms long after it was a specific 
movement, is but one expression of this. This form of realism often sought to elide any 
trace of process of production, and to deliver to the receiver a finished product, to be 
consumed rather than to interact with. A long tradition of critical theory has subjected 
realism to critique from several different perspectives: post-structuralism and decon- 
struction; broadly Marxist and historical materialist; and psychoanalytic, to name but 
three main trends. These are all accounts that refuse to accept at face value UHDOLVP¶V 
account of itself as producing works whose features are determined by the real or 
actual perceptual, social or moral world that they purport merely to convey. A clas- 
sical critique of the pretensions of literary realism is Roland %DUWKHV¶V S/Z.16 Barthes 
proposes an entirely different picture of the realist text: one where the making of the 
text comes to the fore, and the interweaving of codes as being responsible for the pro- 
duction of an illusion of reality, a realist effect, which far from allowing real society to 
stamp itself on the work, forms what counts as realist. There are many other critiques 
in a similar vein, a whole movement of anti-realism, which has made any form of 
straightforward realism an impossible theoretical position. For a humanities scholar 
steeped in post-structuralism, deconstruction and postmodernism, it is difficult not to 
consider VFLHQWLVWV¶ use of terms like µUHDOLVP¶ and µUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶ as hopelessly naïve, 
and as evidence of a positivism that stubbornly lingers, or paradoxically becomes even 
more robust. Yet even across all artistic forms, it cannot be said that realism has 
succumbed before these critiques, and it continues as a more or less robust form, 
particularly in film and literature. At the same time, it is not necessary to be a card-
carrying realist WREHµZRUOG-GLUHFWHG¶LQVRPHway, and this impetus has taken on a 
huge variety of aesthetic forms and modalities. Whatever realism might be, univocal 
it certainly is not. But that is the point: world-directedness has different modes, 
different styles. 
Critiques of realism in critical theory began before similar moves in science stud- 
ies and have several similarities. Typical of the critique of realism in critical theory 
is the demonstration of the constructed nature of realist works, bringing to the fore 
the processes of production involved in them. We see a very similar trend in science 
and technology studies (STS), starting out with a work that could be considered the 
STS counterpart to %DUWKHV¶V S/Z: Latour and :RROJDU¶V Laboratory Life.17 Science is 
described by Latour and Woolgar as a massive, concerted literary endeavour. 6FLHQFH¶V 
objective is the persuasion of readers rather than the discovery and revelation of facts; 
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hence it is mobilised around literary inscriptions. The influence of semiotics is evident 
in many key passages of the book, in particular the treatment of scientific discourse as 
a form of fiction, which, through textual characteristics, gives rise to a µWUXWK HIIHFW¶18 
The attention to inscriptions has continued to be developed within science and tech- 
nology studies, with continued strong emphasis on the sociality within which inscrip- 
tions  are embedded.19 
A difference between STS as it would go on to be defined and practised, and the 
critical theory/semiotics from which Latour and Woolgar took inspiration, is  the 
extent to which critical theory, in its various forms, gave precedence to the productive 
capacity of the matter of textuality ± the writerly, the painterly, the grain of the voice: 
écriture, sémeiosis, the trace, among others. An example of an approach in science 
studies that stands out for developing and extending ideas in critical theory is Hans- 
Jörg 5KHLQEHUJHU¶V use of 'HUULGD¶V notions of différance, trace and grafting to talk 
about experimental systems.20   He writes  that 
to see experimental systems as pervaded by différance [. . .] stresses that the system 
undergoes a play of differences and oppositions governed by its own operator- 
time, and at the same time that it decalates or displaces what at any given moment 
appear to be its borders.21 
When the borderlines around systems are seen to be constantly displaced, experimen- 
tal systems appear as grafts of other experimental systems in an ongoing grafting of 
one upon the other, in what is often a meandering path. The scientific enterprise is seen 
as essentially temporal, and not necessarily structured with the narrative coherence 
that a traditional history might give it (for example, from origins in the form of a prob- 
lem to be solved or question to be investigated to the solution of the problem or the 
answering of the question). It may be seen to be µJURSLQJ EOLQGO\¶ or to be empirically 
meandering rather than having definitive goals determined by preset hypotheses. µ7KH 
significance or, better, the significant units of the experimental system concatenate into 
a constantly changing signifying context. There is no direct progress toward a definite 
³PHDQLQJ´²ZKDWHYHU³PHDQLQJ´PLJKWPHDQKHUH¶22 Episodes of discovery, or of 
definitive claims, are post hoc narrative reconstructions. This is the power of narrative 
to give form to episodes in time, and to demarcate the boundaries of a progress story. 
When the question of µIDLWKIXOQHVV¶ between scientific claim and real-world entity or 
process actually comes up, therefore, it cannot be considered apart from the narrative 
that draws the borders within which faithfulness can even be considered. Modelling is 
part of an experimental system; in fact, in the case of systems biomedical modelling, 
it is part of hybrid experimental systems. Whether µD PRGHO¶ accurately represents its 
target domain is similarly a question of where the borders of its system are 
drawn, and through which narrative reconstructions they are drawn. 
5KHLQEHUJHU¶V strategy does not collapse the construction of scientific facts upon 
social construction; instead, he retains the typical humanities concern with textual 
forms of meaning-making, where processes of meaning that hinge upon the materiality 
of meaning systems (differing, tracing, grafting) are focused upon in their own right. 
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The result is not so much an undercutting of objectivity for scientific claims as a differ- 
ent framing of this objectivity in an account that shows how it comes about that some 
VFLHQWLILFFODLPVFRPHWREHHQGRZHGZLWKDµVFLHQWLILFREMHFW¶DQGWo be considered 
µZLWKLQ the WUXWK¶ For Rheinberger, textual processes of meaning are an ineliminable 
aspect of this: 
At a given moment and in a given research process, what, say, a microsome or a 
virus µUHSUHVHQWV¶ ± in the sense of how it is µSURGXFHG¶ how it is µEURXJKW IRUWK¶ ± is 
an articulation of graphemes traced and confined by the procedures of the research 
process.23 
7KHQDUUDWLYHHOHPHQWVRI5KHLQEHUJHU¶VDFFRXQWDUHQRWDIRUPRIILFWLRQDOLVP To 
DGRSW5KHLQEHUJHU¶V perspective on models does not lead to the conclusion that the 
entities they target are fictional rather than real, or that they are somehow inaccurate 
or only approximations of the truth. Textual and narrative processes produce experi- 
mental systems, together with the domain that they investigate: models, together with 
their targets. The question of whether they are µUHDOLVWLF¶ can only be asked within 
bounded systems produced and constructed through these processes, and only at cer- 
tain SRLQWVRIWKHµKLVWRULDOLW\¶RIWKHVFLHQFH7KHGHPDQGIRUUHDOLVPPDGH across 
disciplines in systems biomedical modelling may be premature, since what can be 
µUHDOLVW¶LQWKHFXUUHQWVWDJHRIRQJRLQJK\EULGLVDWLRQRIPRGHOV± or of grafting of 
experimental systems, in 5KHLQEHUJHU¶V terms ± is as yet undefined and indeterminate. 
However, that the demand plays such a prominent part in the interactions among dis- 
ciplines also points to it as an important site of grafting, where the meaning of what 
it is to be realistic will be worked out at the same time as the experimental systems 
become interwoven. 
 
Beyond Dualism 
These ways of addressing questions of realism, and related notions of faithfulness, 
representation and so on, lead to a disintegration of any neat dualism of model and 
target. We have already seen that talking about models as though they are clearly 
bounded things is highly problematic in the case of the models typical of systems 
biomedicine, since there is no single element that is a model, but rather a series of 
inter-related modelling processes with different objects, tools, techniques and visual 
displays. This view may lead to the temptation to overemphasise the active role of 
models in constructing the target domain. On this view, agency is seen as being all 
on the side of modelling, whereas the object that is modelled is passive. Modelling as 
agent forges the relationship whereby models can be said to be µRI¶a target domain, 
and at the same time constitute the target domain. Different forms of constructiv- 
ism (social, historical or post-structuralist/writerly) lead to variants on this view. 
Increasingly, however, the stark opposition between constructivism and realism is 
giving way before a number of different proposals for overcoming the persistent 
dualisms between subject and object, nature and culture, matter and meaning that 
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have dogged Western thought for so long. A good example is Karen %DUDG¶V agential 
realism, discussed in the Introduction to this volume, which locates agency in sci- 
HQFH¶V objects as well as in science, in the non-human as well as the human.24 For 
Barad, the µVXEMHFWV¶ µREMHFWV¶ and instruments of science are co-constituted through 
their intra-actions with each other. Far from being independently constituted and 
externally related, these are entangled with each other. 
Drawing upon the later work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Aud Sissel Hoel and I 
have proposed a non-dualist ontology around the notion of the measuring body.25 
The measuring body is an instantiation of what Merleau-Ponty calls µIOHVK¶ some- 
thing that is neither subject nor object, neither consciousness nor  substance,  but 
rather µWKH formative medium of the object and the VXEMHFW¶26 Our approach focuses 
on the mediation of scientific domains that occurs through the measuring body as 
an interconnection of perceptual, symbolic and technological modalities of expres- 
sion in multi-dimensional environments. The measuring body is not the body of a 
discrete being, but a particular way of intertwining modalities of expression, enti- 
ties and environments, specifying what counts as the µUHDO¶ things and processes of 
an environment ± for example, a scientific domain. People, as well as other objects, 
are caught up and operate in the measuring body, to be measured as well as measur- 
ing. By measuring we mean a kind of standard setting, a system of equivalences and 
differences between modalities and things; such systems have distinctive styles of 
parsing and interconnecting things. They emanate from a particular way of opening 
out onto the world ± a particular stance, one might say; but they are never unidirec- 
tional, as the things that are specified through such stylised systems are intertwined 
in reciprocal, mutual relations. Whatever opens onto things is also opened onto by 
other things with which they are intertwined. There is a complicity between seers 
and seen, between interrogators and interrogated. We underscore the continuities 
between science and art as expressive modalities of meaning, in that they do not 
merely communicate pre-existent meanings or represent  in  an  external  way,  but 
forge new styles of meaning and knowing, and new  domains  (or  environments), 
where words like µUHDO¶ and µUHDOLVWLF¶ come to have determinate ± or at least work- 
ing ± meanings. If scientific domains are specified through their measuring bodies, 
then trying to cross or connect them ± for example, through  interdisciplinarity  ± 
entails encountering and grappling with different styles, in an  encroachment  of 
styles upon each other that reshapes and respecifies that domain, and everything, 
everyone,  implicated  in it.27 
The positions that I have outlined ± %DUDG¶V +RHO¶V and my own ± are just a small 
sample of current attempts to break out of the dualisms of subject and object, mind 
and matter, knower and known. These dualisms are deeply entrenched in Western 
thought and difficult finally to push out and have done with: hence, the many differ- 
ent attempts at building a non-dualist framework for thinking, from different angles 
and perspectives. Having started off with critiques of realism, we are now at a point 
where our main concern is not to deconstruct ideas about faithfulness and accuracy 
of representation. Rather, we need to understand how the enterprise of rendering the 
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world, knowing and acting in it, in its intertwinement of bodies, technologies, expres- 
sivities, forms ourselves and our world, and what may be the forms of responsibility 
that flow from that.28 
 
Modelling Systems Biomedicine and its Patients 
Going beyond a critique of realism to accounts of world-directedness that attempt dif- 
ferent frameworks for non-dualist thinking opens possibilities for considering systems 
biomedicine as a domain that is modelled as it uses models to investigate biological 
and physiological processes. The models and the domain modelled are not externally 
constituted entities that are in a face-off with each other, as in a positivistic realism; 
rather, they are inextricably intertwined with each other, through, for example, the 
materiality and visuality of the different processes and activities involved in it. Systems 
biomedicine emerges as a grafted, entangled and intertwined domain, in which all of 
the elements are mutually defined, in complicity with each other, defining a style of 
realism. Implicated in this style are people, as well as other entities: for example, the 
patients and the public of systems  biomedicine. 
Systems biomedicine promises a reconfiguration of disease, diagnosis and treat- 
PHQWWKDWZLOOEHWWHUVHUYHSDWLHQWVDQGµFRQVXPHUV¶29 In fact, in its data-intensive 
form, systems biomedicine must implicate us, not at the end of a pipeline that starts 
with science and ends with the diagnosis and treatment of people. As a mode of 
research, data-intensive systems biomedicine requires the active participation of indi- 
viduals to provide data, either through consenting to their data being used and reused, 
or through self-monitoring on a variety of applications on their mobile devices, com- 
puters and different kinds of kit, and donating data. With this is born the idea of the 
patient or person as medical data generator. The whole enterprise of developing sys- 
tems biomedicine frequently invokes the µGLJLWDO SDWLHQW¶ This is conceived as an indi- 
YLGXDOLVHGPRGHORIHDFKSHUVRQFRQVWUXFWHGIURPWKHµWULOOLRQVRIGDWDSRLQWV¶ that 
an individual data generator could generate over a lifetime.30 However, the data from 
one person, as abundant as it might be, could not by itself be used to model the pro- 
gression of a condition or disease, or be used to target diagnoses and treatments spe- 
cifically to that person. For this, whole populations of data generators are required, 
so that statistical processes and computational methods can be used to make accurate 
predictions. Therefore this is both an individual and a community effort. On an indi- 
vidualist rhetoric, RQH¶V µUHZDUG¶ is that one receives RQH¶V own personalised model on 
which to test the outcomes of different treatments. For example, on the website of the 
µ'LJLWDO Patient 3URMHFW¶ there is the following patient-directed statement: 
The Digital Patient is an envisaged  super-sophisticated  computer  program  that 
will be capable of generating a virtual living version of yourself. When this is 
achieved, it will be possible to run µVLPXODWLRQV¶ of health and disease processes 
on the virtual or µGLJLWDO¶ you, and use the results to make predictions about your 
real health. It will also be possible to determine the best treatment specifically for 
you. This is termed µSHUVRQDOLVHG PHGLFLQH¶ and is intended to be the future of 
healthcare.31 
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Here we find the familiar dualisms around the virtual and the real, which run like a 
red thread throughout the SURMHFW¶V ongoing deliberations concerning what visualisa- 
tions could be used to engage individual users. This is a challenge for the project, and 
in newsletters and other project reports there are traces of different solutions put for- 
ward at different times. The idea of an avatar as the main interface between µUHDO¶ and 
µGLJLWDO¶ patients is proposed; taking up prominent gaming devices such as Microsoft 
Xbox Live, it is suggested that it should be made to look like individual patients for 
µHPRWLRQDO LQWHQVLILFDWLRQ¶32 Although this idea does not find its way into the final 
project report, a further trace of it is an animated film showing a scenario of what 
such a consultation might be like. A patient is shown an avatar, which is at first of a 
generic human that (in the SDWLHQW¶V voice) is described as µEUHDWKLQJ and moving its 
H\HV¶ and when made to jog, µVWDUWHG to VZHDW¶ We hear the patient say that he does 
not understand what this has to do with his check-up, but he is then asked to stand on 
a platform and is scanned by a laser, and µVXGGHQO\ the model on the screen changed 
DQGLWZDVPHLWHYHQKDGP\IDFH¶GRZQWRµDOOP\VNLQ EOHPLVKHV¶33 
As yet, we do not know what form something like the digital patient might take. 
7KLVLVDFRQWH[WZKHUHZKDWµUHDOLVP¶PHDQVZLOOEHDVSROLWLFDODTXHVWLRQDVLW  is 
a representational one. With the extension of the modelling of systems biomedicine 
beyond science, into the clinic and well into the public space, we become part of 
that world that will become intertwined with modelling; those biological and physi- 
RORJLFDOSURFHVVHVPRGHOOHGDUHµRXUV¶LQXVDQGRXURZQEHLQJZLOOEH co-defined 
and co-constituted along with that of the models. What modelling and its relationship 
to the world become is a topic urgently requiring critical engagement on the part of 
the humanities scholar. Not only the science, but also the material, textual and visual 
interfaces ± that is, the familiar territory of the humanities scholar ± are crucial to 
the imaginary of science and public alike. This is an engagement that needs to work 
alongside modelling from as early as possible; we cannot wait until models are defined 
and entrenched to the point where they are too heavy to shift. This engagement with 
modelling is at the same time technoscientific, biological and social; it demands from 
us epistemic, aesthetic and ethical awareness and readiness in order to participate in 
the making of knowledge, the forms and styles of modelling and representing, and the 
ethico-political stakes in the enterprise. The complicity between modelling and world 
here takes on a political overtone, but tracing our way back to when science seemed to 
be µMXVW VFLHQFH¶ we will find it was always there. 
 
Conclusion 
I opened this chapter by suggesting that one of the roles of the critical medical 
humanities scholar in a field such as systems biomedicine is to bring into the conver- 
sation about models a greater range of ways in which artefacts like models express 
and enact their world-directedness. Bringing forward examples such as Picasso is a 
way of opening up different perspectives on world-directedness, as this is experi- 
mented with in art as well as in science. When we do bring forward such examples 
with confidence and without accepting that the only thing that science might learn 
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from art are the limitations of the relationship to the real (as in the deficit account of 
fictions), we are also able to acknowledge that modelling is productive and forma- 
tive in just the ways that art has long known itself to be; that being µZRUOG-GLUHFWHG¶ 
implies not representational accuracy between a model and its target, but an inter- 
twinement of modelling apparatuses, languages, techniques, biology and people. 
The ontology of intertwinement, or other forms of non-dualism, does not neatly dis- 
tinguish representers, representations and their objects; neither does it allow for neat 
parcellings-out of science and society; rather it focuses on the specific intertwine- 
ments that engender the worlds we inhabit and ourselves as inhabitants. Respon- 
sibility does not come after science µFDSWXUHV¶ reality; if anything, it is even more 
pressing than science in its realist mode, since the logic of intertwinement brings a 
responsibility for the form that systems biomedicine takes across laboratory, clinic 
and world. For humanities scholars, taking on board the ontology of intertwinement 
implies accepting to participate in this responsibility, in the forming of the reality of 
something like systems biomedicine. 
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